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THE TURING MACHINE ON 
THE DISSECTING TABLE
Abstract: Since the beginning of the 
twenty-! rst century there has been an
increasing awareness that so" ware rep-
resents a blind spot in new media theory.
$ e growing interest in so" ware also
in% uences the argument in this paper,
which sets out from the assumption that 
Alan M. Turing’s concept of the universal 
machine, the ! rst theoretical description
of a  computer program (so" ware), is
a kind of bachelor machine (Carrouges).
Previous writings based on a  similar 
hypothesis (Daniels, Baudrillard,
Turkle, Ascott) have focused either on
a  comparison of the universal machine
and the bachelor machine in terms of the
similarities of their structural features,
or they have taken the bachelor machine
as a metaphor for a man or a computer 
(arti! cial intelligence). Unlike them, this
paper stresses the importance of the con-
text (the imitation game of the Turing 
test) as a key to interpreting the universal 
Turing machine as a bachelor machine
and, potentially, as a self-portrait.
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Abstrakt: Od  začátku 21. století roste 
vědomí, že so" ware je slepou skvrnou 
teorie nových médií. Vzrůstající zájem 
o  so" ware ovlivnil také tezi předklá-
daného příspěvku. Vychází z  předpo-
kladu, že koncept univerzálního stroje 
Alana M. Turinga je jedním z mláde-
neckých strojů (Carrouges). Předchozí 
texty založené na  podobné hypotéze 
(Daniels, Baudrillard, Turkle, Ascott) 
se zaměřily buď na  srovnání univer-
zálního stroje a  mládeneckého stroje 
na základě jejich strukturálních podob-
ností, nebo užívaly mládenecký stroj 
jako metaforu člověka nebo počítače 
(umělé inteligence). Na  rozdíl od nich, 
tento příspěvek zdůrazňuje význam 
kontextu (imitační hry Turingova 
testu), který je klíčem k  interpretaci 
univerzálního Turingova stroje jako 
mládeneckého stroje a potenciálně jako 
autoportrétu.
Klíčová slova: Turingův stroj; 
mládenecký stroj; Turingův test; 
pitevní stůl; kouzlo
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! e so" ware turn
Since the beginning of the twenty-! rst century, there has been an increasing 
awareness among humanities scholars that so" ware, the internal structure 
and the processes performed inside a computer have remained a blind spot 
in new media studies. So" ware had hitherto been considered a tool, a thing 
that merely ! gures in the realm of a machine’s functionality. Now that the 
bubble of newness of the new media has burst, it is clear that a systematic 
and critical analysis of the functional features of new media and a recon-
sideration of them in a historical perspective and in the cultural production 
context have yet to be done.1
Inside the black box
$ e turn to so" ware in the discourse of new media studies has been moti-
vated by an e% ort to open up and to analyse the black box of the computer 
from the inside. $ e belief now is that it is not the interface but the inner 
structure and programmability of the computer that de! nes the medium. 
$ us, the turn to so" ware marks a shi"  from interface to the layers of the 
new media below the surface, which mostly operate unconsciously.
 $ e internal functional features of computers a% ect a broad spectrum 
of cultural practices that occur through and around them. $ e power and 
in& uence of computational processes over di% erent cultural practices is even 
higher because they have remained in the dark, inside the box, for a  long 
time. $ us, the black box of the computer must be opened and examined in 
the way other cultural products and practices are analysed and interpreted.
From code to context
$ e paper focuses on Alan M. Turing’s concept of the universal Turing 
machine (also just called the Turing machine), which is the ! rst theoreti-
cal description of the computer program (so" ware). $ e universal machine 
has already captured the attention of a number of new media scholars. Ap-
proaches within so" ware studies are represented by Friedrich Kittler and 
Mathew Fuller. While Kittler deals primarily with code as the language of 
1  For more information on the so" ware turn in new media studies, see: Jana HORÁKOVÁ, 
“K recepci informatiky v kontextu společenských věd: Obrat k so" waru.” In: KLÍMOVÁ, H. 
– KUŽELOVÁ, D. – ŠÍMA, J. – WIEDERMANN, J. – ŽÁK, S. (eds.), Hovory s  informatiky. 
Praha: Ústav informatiky AV ČR v.v.i. 2011, p. 117–135.
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programming media, Fuller calls for a broader understanding of the pro-
gramming and processes that occur through the computer to link technol-
ogy with its context.
Kittler was one of the " rst media theorists to deal with so# ware in the 
new media studies perspective.2 He considers the computer to be a descend-
ent of the typewriter and points to the symbolic and transformative power of 
the universal Turing machine. In his view, while the typewriter transformed 
handwriting into a chain of discrete letters of the alphabet, the computer 
completed the transformation of the symbolic order by replacing letters with 
a (secret) code of numbers (ciphers).3 He writes:
From the Remington via the Turing machine to microelectronics, from mecha-
nization and automatization to the implementation of a writing that is only 
cipher, [...] one century was enough to transfer the age-old monopoly of writing 
into the omnipotence of integrated circuits. [...] All data streams $ ow into a state 
n of Turing’s universal machine; Romanticism notwithstanding, numbers, and 
" gures become the key to all creatures.4
According to Kittler, the code of programming languages has become the 
dominant mode of representation in the computer age.5 As a  result, the 
historical order, based on narratives, has been replaced by the program-
mable media order, which involves/is based on the abstract, isolated, and, 
in its isolation, omnipotent universe of mathematics. At the core of the 
mathematic order is a seductive concept of general substitution.6 % us, the 
computer can be seen as an isolated universe of symbols within which it is 
possible to completely represent the world or even to replace a human with 
a simulation of one.
2 Friedrich A. KITTLER, “% ere Is No So# ware.” In: KROKER, A. – KROKER, M. (eds.),
C-theory net [online]. Available at: <http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=74> [cit. 12. 8. 
2013]. Originally published as Friedrich A. KITTLER, “Es gibt keine So# ware.” Draculas 
Vermächtnis: Technische Schri! en. Leipzig: Reclam 1993, p. 225–242.
3  Friedrich A. KITTLER, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Stanford: Stanford University Press
1999. Originally published as Friedrich A. KITTLER, Grammophon, Film, Schreibmaschine. 
Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose 1986.
See also Friedrich A. KITTLER, “Code (or, How You Can Write Something Di& erently).” In: 
FULLER, M. (ed.), So! ware Studies: A Lexicon. Cambridge: % e MIT Press 2008, p. 40–47.
4  KITTLER, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, pp. 18–19.
5  KITTLER, “Code,“ p. 40.
6  Wendy Hui Kyong CHUN, Programmed Visions: So! ware and Memory. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press 2011.
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Mathew Fuller adopted a  di" erent perspective. His focus is the pro-
gramming and other practices that occur around and through computers. It 
is his belief that in order to know more about the in# uence programmable 
media have on our culture we must study not only the media itself, but also 
the activities that occur through and around them. He writes:
So$ ware marks another of its beginnings in Alan Turing’s desire to chart the 
computable, [...] within the terms of mathematics. Computation establishes 
a toy world in conformity with its axioms, but at the same time, when it becomes 
so$ ware, it must, [...], come into combination with what lies outside code. [...]
And it is this paradox, the ability to mix the formalized with the more messy - 
non-mathematical formalisms, linguistic, and visual objects and codes, events 
occurring at every scale from the ecological to the erotic and political - which 
gives computation its powerful e" ects, and which folds back into so$ ware in its 
existence as culture.7
So! ware as a toy
Within the e" ort to make so$ ware a part of culture, there is a complemen-
tary ambition to discover new, appropriate, and o$ en subversive method-
ologies for so$ ware studies. Wendy Chun talks metaphorically about the in 
media res8 perspective, referring to giving up the critical distance of general 
statements in favour of close readings, microanalyses, and interpretation of 
particular features and principles of computation.
% is paper contributes to the so$ ware studies perspective, in which so$ -
ware is seen as being part of wider cultural production and imagination and 
is treated not as a tool but as a toy-concept that we can deal with playfully. 
% e argument is placed within and beyond the formal scienti& c discourse, 
as well as within conscious and unconscious parts of human mind activities. 
% e universal machine is treated both as a self-portrait (in the sense that it 
represents activities of the human mind) and as a symbol of Alan Turing’s 
personal and professional life tragedy. My hypothesis is that the universal 
Turing machine can be seen as a kind of compiler, which is transcoding the 
bachelor machine (the symbol of the vain urge for transcendence) into the 
Turing machine (the symbol of the transformation).
7 Matthew FULLER (ed.), So! ware Studies: A  Lexicon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2008,
p. 5–6 (1–13).
8 CHUN, Programmed Visions.
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! e universal Turing machine
Alan Turing’s universal (computing) machine (later renamed the Turing 
machine) warrants special attention because it is the ! rst theoretical expla-
nation of the stored program computer (so" ware), which directly in# uenced 
early thinking on the nature of computation and the modern electronic 
computer’s architecture. Moreover, the supposition that Turing based the 
concept of the universal machine is that any complex operation can be re-
duced to a series of simple steps described as mathematical functions (add, 
subtract, multiply, etc.) is what lies at the heart of all programming.
Turing presented the concept of the universal machine for the 
! rst time in “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem”.9 He explained that the universal machine consists 
of an in! nitely long piece of paper comprising an in! nite number of boxes 
and through these a mathematical calculation, even a very complex one, can 
be performed by following a series of actions based on the symbols in the 
boxes. % e hypothetical machine was described in the chapter Computing 
Machines as follows:
% e machine is supplied with a “tape” (the analogue of paper) running through 
it, and divided into sections (called “squares”) each capable of bearing a “sym-
bol”. At any moment, there is just one square [...], which is “in the machine”. We 
may call this square the “scanned square”. % e symbol on the scanned square 
may be called the “scanned symbol”. % e “scanned symbol” is the only one of 
which the machine is, so to speak, “directly aware”. However, [...] the machine 
can e& ectively remember some of the symbols which it has “seen” (scanned) 
previously.10
As the quotation itself implies, rhetorical ! gures based on analogies between 
the human mind and computing machines are applied next to exact math-
ematical formulations on the paper. One more example for all:
For the present I shall only say that the justi! cation lies in the fact that human 
memory is necessarily limited. We may compare a man in the process of com-
9 Alan M. TURING, “On Computable Numbers with an Application to the Entschei-
dungsproblem.” In: Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, vol. 42, 1936, no.  2, 
p.  230–265. Available online at: <http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Turing_Paper_1936.
pdf > [cit. 14. 8. 2013].
10 TURING, “On Computable Numbers,” p. 231.
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puting a real numbers to a machine, which is only capable of a " nite number of 
conditions.11
However, the association of the universal Turing machine with man is made 
not only on the level of metaphor. Explaining the machine’s operations 
Turing refers to the similarities and analogies between a human’s and a com-
putational machine’s invisible functional characteristics. To enable a com-
parison and link the concept of a human to the concept of a computer, the 
model and de" nition of man must be reduced to an “information processing 
system”.12 Hayles regards this reduction within Turing’s argument as a sig-
ni" cant contribution to the discourses of cybernetics and posthumanism.
# e mechanical aesthetics of Marcel Duchamp’s seminal work ! e Bride 
Stripped by Her Bachelors, Even (! e Large Glass) enables us to compare 
it with the universal Turing machine. # is way we can develop thinking 
in analogies between the computing machine and the exercises of the hu-
man mind to describe their similarities in such features that lie outside the 
“retinal world”. Moreover, both (conceptual) apparatuses refer to the notion 
of the “bachelor machine” that makes it possible to articulate the dominant 
image-myth of the mechanical age that has spread through the collective 
unconscious. 13
! e bachelor machine
Marcel Duchamp coined the term bachelor machine (or machine céli-
bataire) around 1913, when he named the lower glass plate of his seminal 
work ! e Bride Stripped by Her Bachelors, Even (1915–1923) or in short 
! e Large Glass. # e bachelor machine referred to the realm of mechanical 
components, a water paddle, scissors, a chocolate grinder, a sledge, and nine 
balloon-like pods called the Malic Molds. # ese Malic Molds represent nine 
bachelors condemned to eternal longing for the Bride that remains remote 
in the upper glass plate realm.
11 Ibid., p. 231.
12  Katherine N. HAYLES, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics. Chicago – London: University of Chicago Press 1999.
13  Dieter Daniels was probably the " rst new media theorist to see certain resemblances 
between the functional features of Turing’s computing machine and ! e Large Glass by Marcel 
Duchamp, and elaborated this observation by using the term the bachelor machine. Dieter 
DANIELS, “Duchamp: Interface: Turing: A Hypothetical Encounter between the Bachelor 
Machine and the Universal Machine.” In: GRAU, O. (ed.), Media Art Histories. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press 2007, p. 103–136.
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However, later on the bachelor machine acquired the status of a broader 
concept in the art theory. Michel Carrouges appropriated the term to point 
out the structural similarities between Marcel Duchamp’s ! e Large Glass
and di" erent apparatuses described by writers in the second half of the nine-
teenth and the early twentieth century.14 For example, a punitive apparatus
described by Franz Ka# a in the short story In the Penal Colony (1919), or
apparatuses designated in novels Impressions d’Afrique (1915) by Raymond
Roussel, or Le Surmâle (1915) by Alfred Jarry, and many others.
By deciding to articulate the shared structure of these apparatuses with 
the term bachelor machine Carrouges pays homage to ! e Large Glass, 
which is the only visual, and not literary, depiction of a bachelor machine 
within Carrouges’s theory. According to him, all bachelor machines share 
“the sexual origin of ! e Large Glass mechanics and their signi$ cation
of death”. % ey assume the form of a blueprint or a diagram made of me-
chanical and visceral structures, referring both to mechanisms that are 
“un$ nished, un$ nishable, and incapable of operating in reality” and to 
the “mental machines, the imaginary working of which su&  ces to produce 
a real movement of the mind”. % us, bachelor machines are usually reminis-
cent of scienti$ c images or technical drawings, which mediate knowledge 
about un-presentable and unconscious phenomena and forces. Carrouges 
interpreted the bachelor machine as a concept that emerges from and refers 
to the collective imagination and that thus acquires the status of the myth of 
the man of the mechanical age.
! e bachelor machine’s anatomy
All bachelor machines share certain structural features. % ey operate as 
closed circuits between an upper and a  lower part, within which the mes-
sage from the upper zone is inscribed upon the lower one. Each bachelor 
machine consists of two overlapping mechanisms, the desiring machine 
and the su" ering machine. It is a kind of diagram made of two overlapping 
layers, which represents the forces of the vain desire for transgression, both 
towards love and death, which characterize modern man.
% e desiring machine: ! e Large Glass’s apparatus represents the layer 
of the desiring machine. It consists of two distinct realms, the realm of the 
bride above and the realm of the bachelors below. % ere is a vertical bound-
ary between them, which makes impossible their immediate contact. % e 
14  Michel CARROUGES, Les Machines célibataires. Paris: Arcanes 1954.
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bachelors in the lower part are imagining and desiring the bride without any 
possibility of comprehension because the mechanism of communication is 
frozen into death in the glass.
! e su" ering machine: A torture apparatus similar in structure to ! e 
Large Glass is found in Franz Ka$ a’s In the Penal Colony and represents the 
layer of the su" ering machine. ! e apparatus consists of a  lower part, the 
bed, and the upper part, the designer. Between them, there is a section called 
a harrow, which is a piece of glass in which needles are % xed and that can 
be moved up and down. ! e condemned man has to lie on the bed and his 
o" ence is written into his back with the harrow. ! e man is not told of his 
o" ence. He must learn it through his body, sentenced to death.
! e universal machine: ! e universal machine shares its functional fea-
tures with other bachelor machines. It consists of two horizontally separate 
realms, the upper part called the head and the lower part made of the tape. 
! e head scans, writes, and reads the tape according to its current state. ! e 
writing device, in the shape of a needle, writes and erases signs according to 
its program, while the tape moves back and forth, mediating communica-
tion between the upper and lower part.
! e bachelor machine in the new media discourse
Dieter Daniels made a comparison of Marcel Duchamp’s ! e Large Glass
and Turing’s universal machine in an attempt to prove that the bachelor ma-
chine, which emerged in the world of art, can o" er new, illuminating insight 
into the understanding of computer-mediated communication which has 
become the dominant means of communication and self-representation in 
the computer age. He suggested naming the current information and com-
munication technologies “the universal bachelor machine”. ! is neologism 
embodies his opinion that the most signi% cant articulations of the bachelor 
machine are no longer found in the world of art but in the realm of new 
media, which are more and more de% ning and restricting the ways in which 
we communicate with other people and experience the world we live in. He 
wrote, “[the] bachelor machine, having started out as an artistic vision, has 
turned into a way of embracing and developing technologies”.15
15  Dieter DANIELS, “Duchamp: Interface: Turing: A Hypothetical Encounter between the 
Bachelor Machine and the Universal Machine.” In: GRAU, O. (ed.), Media Art Histories. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007, p. 130 (103–136).
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Daniels made the most re! ned contribution to rethinking the bachelor 
machine concept in new media theory. However, other remarkable examples 
of applications of the bachelor machine concept or of analogies between 
computers and ! e Large Glass can be found in the new media discourse. 
Jean Baudrillard wrote that the bachelor machine represents the arti! cial in-
telligence of computers because they are unable feeling pleasure. He insisted 
that this is the last di" erence between man and machine. “What will always 
distinguish the functioning of even the most intelligent machine from man 
is the ecstasy, the pleasure of functioning [...].”16 Sherry Turkle, focusing
on the computer user, wrote that the geeks, nerds, and hackers who spend 
nights with computers live in so-called “bachelor mode”.17 Roy Ascott used
an analogy between ! e Large Glass and the computer monitor to provide an 
insightful description of the interface. He wrote that:
We see in the work known as [...] # e Large Glass a ! eld of vitreous reality in 
which energy and emotions are generated from tension and interaction of male 
and female, natural and arti! cial, human and machine. [...] Its subject is attrac-
tion [...]. As “ground”, # e Large Glass has function and status anticipating that 
of the computer monitor as a screen of operations – of transformations and as 
the site of interaction and negotiation for meaning.18
! e universal machine as a self-portrait
# e following argument deals with similarities between functional features 
of the universal machine and the bachelor machine as well. # ese two con-
cepts are treated as portrayals of the hidden (unconscious) processes that go 
on beneath the computer desktop in the case of the universal machine, and 
the unconscious forces inside the mind of a man in the case of the bachelor 
machine.
# e universal machine is seen not as a counterpart of the bachelor ma-
chine in the techno-science discourse,19 but as one of many articulations of 
16  Jean BAUDRILLARD, “Videowelt und fraktales Subjekt.” In: Ars Electronica (ed.), 
Philosophie der neuen Technologien. Berlin: Merve 1989, p. 130 (113–133).
17  Sherry TURKLE,! e Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit. New York: Simon and 
Schuster 1984, p. 198.
18  Roy ASCOTT, “Is # ere Love in Telematic Embrace?” In: SHANKEN, E. (ed.). Roy Ascott. 
Telematic Embrace. Visionary ! eories of Art, Technology, and Consciousness. Berkeley – Los
Angeles – London: University of California Press 2003, p. 235 (232–246).
19 Cf. DANIELS, “Duchamp: Interface: Turing”.
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the bachelor machine. ! us, their relationship is not based on a dichotomy 
and should rather be ideated as a kind of palimpsest, as a drawing on which 
one can see at # rst glance the universal machine description, but upon 
second glance will see the diagram of the bachelor machine emerge from 
within its background.
! e link between subject of Alan Turing and the concept of the universal 
machine is constituted by playing with signi# cant slips of the tongue within 
scienti# c writings rhetoric. ! e genre of the universal machine image that is 
going to be drawn is close to the self-portrait.
! e human computer
We can ask what kind of man served Turing as the inspiration for the com-
puting machine. Turing described the man he had in mind in chapter 4, 
Digital computers:
! e idea behind digital computers may be explained by saying that these ma-
chines are intended to carry out any operations which could be done by a hu-
man computer. ! e human computer is supposed to be following # xed rules; 
he has no authority to deviate from them in any detail. We may suppose that 
these rules are supplied in a book, which is altered whenever he is put on to 
a new job.20
! us, the universal machine resembles a human computer, someone who is 
counting all the time. It could be a bookkeeper, an accountant, or a bureau-
crat, simply someone who is “squirreling around in the back o$  ce, shu%  ing 
through stacks of rigged paper, reading, writing, and erasing numbers in 
little boxes”.21
! e freak of numbers
However, Turing points to the much better performance and accuracy of the 
counting done by the universal machine than the man-computer. ! us, we 
can say that the model is not merely a conscientious bureaucrat, but rather 
someone who has an extraordinary memory, who is very accurate and persis-
20  Alan TURING, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Mind, vol. 59, 1950, no. 236 
(433–460). Available online at: <http://loebner.net/Prizef/TuringArticle.html> [cit. 12.  8. 
2013].
21  Warren SACK, “Memory.” In: FULLER, M. (ed.) So! ware studies, p. 188 (184–193).
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tent in his counting, and who is able to solve very complicated mathematical 
and logical problems. Hence, Mathew Fuller calls precursors of computers 
“freaks of number”22 and he refers to computers as the descendants of these 
eccentric freaks or prodigies, whose talent reveals itself in the form of mono-
maniacal, enormously fast, and extremely accurate counting.23
! e mathematician
We can speculate that it is almost impossible that Turing would be able 
to avoid any self-re! ection while describing the human mind in a state of 
computing. # erefore, another possibility is to search for analogies between 
the computational abilities of the universal machine and the excellent per-
formances of the mind of its inventor, Alan Turing himself.
Turing’s biographer, Andrew Hodges, suggested certain relations 
between the universal machine concept, in particular the $ rst of its two 
axioms, its isolation (the second one is its completeness), and the person 
Alan Turing. He wrote:
[T]he discrete state machine, communicating by teleprinter alone, was like 
an ideal for his own life, in which he would like to be le%  alone in a room of 
his own, to deal with the outside world solely by rational argument. It was the 
embodiment of J. S. Mill liberal subject, concentrating upon the free will and 
free speech of the individual.24
# e demand for the isolation of the universal machine from the outer world 
can be interpreted as a decision that belongs in the realm of the cold logic 
22 Matthew FULLER, “Freaks of Number.” In: COX, G. – KRYSA, J. (eds.), Engineering 
Culture: “On ! e Author as (Digital) Producer”. New York: Autonomedia (DATA browser 02) 
2005, pp.  161–175. Available on-line: <http://www.spc.org/fuller/texts/freaks-of-number/> 
[cit. 12. 8. 2013].
23  Fuller noted the strange but signi$ cant structure of the book Le Calcul simpli" é par les 
procédés mécanique et graphique, subtitled A History and Description of Instruments and 
Machines of Calculation, Tables, Abacuses and Nomograms by Maurice d’Ocagne published 
in 1894. D’Ocagne included a  list of individuals with exceptional counting skills into the 
Introduction of a book dedicated to taxonomy of counting tools and machines. Fuller regarded 
the arrangement as the inaugural moment of the computer age. He wrote: “What is interesting 
though is that this list of numerical freaks appears at the beginning of a  sober text on the 
means of automating mathematical operations. It is as if it were something that has to be 
acknowledged, marveled at, but disowned. # e chemist describes the alchemists. # is shudder 
of recognition and of admiration passes. # e thing is safely out of their clammy hands, but 
the continuum between these persons and these machines is established.” Ibid., pp. 163–164.
24  Andrew HODGES, Alan Turing: ! e Enigma of Intelligence. London: Unwin 1985, p. 425.
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of mathematics. However, Hodges’s psychological explanation of this de-
mand suggests that the rational purity of mathematical models may be just 
an illusion. Instead, they should be recognized as being entwined within 
human desires, fears, and hopes, as well as the human will to control and 
manipulate the world.
From model to index
Taking the universal machine as a model for the human computer, a prodigy, 
or a mathematician, means e" acing its status as a blueprint for computa-
tional machines in favour of treating it as a model for a human. Based on 
the argument establishing a  link between the universal machine and (the 
person of) Alan Turing, we can refer to the universal machine as a kind of 
self-portrait. However, we should ask, what is the nature of the relationship 
between Turing and the universal machine?
It is common to treat the relationship between the model and the 
original as representation or substitution on the basis of shared features. 
However, dealing with signs in this way can lead to certain misunderstands 
and even mistakes. Turing discussed the risk of thinking in terms of analo-
gies between an original and a model in his paper “# e Chemical Basis of 
Morphogenesis”25. He wrote:
[... the] mathematical model [...] will be described. # is model will be a simpli$ -
cation and idealization, and consequently a falsi$ cation. It is to be held that the 
features retained for discussion are these of the great importance in the present 
state of the knowledge.26
Turing’s words about the weak status of a model express a certain scepticism 
towards a mathematical model’s ability to provide a rich enough representa-
tion of the original.
To avoid thinking in analogies between a model and an original, in 
this case between the universal machine and the person Alan Turing, we 
shall instead employ the speak in terms of indexical references. While in the 
$ rst part of the paper the concept of the bachelor machine was introduced 
as a  suitable analogy for the universal machine by listing their structural 
25  Alan TURING, “# e Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis.” In: Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London. Series Biological Science, vol. 237, 1952, no. 641, p. 37–72. Available




similarities. In the argument below the bachelor machine will represent an 
indexical relationship between the author, Turing, and the universal ma-
chine. ! is will enable us to interpret the relationship between the person 
Alan Turing and the universal machine within the structure of the two 
overlapping diagrams that the bachelor machine comprises. ! is kind of 
relationship can help us to avoid the reductionism of a scienti# c model and 
be more sensitive to the context or the background of the universal machine. 
With this approach we can show that the universal Turing machine is both 
the result of a brilliant exercise in mathematical logic and an index of the 
person Alan Turing, the conscious and unconscious parts of his desires and 
will. We could say that below the universal machine will be subjected to 
a kind of x-ray examination to expose the hidden layers of unconscious and 
(deleted) embodied experience.
! e universal Turing machine on the dissecting table
Dissecting table
Carrouges described the bachelor machine  as a “fantastic image that trans-
forms love into the technique of death” that is # rst of all an “improbable 
machine”, and said that “the determinant structure of these unlikely looking 
machines is based on mathematics”.27 In the e$ ort to explain the basic prin-
ciples shared by all bachelor machines, he pointed to its simpler precursor, 
Lautréamont’s formula from Le Chants de Maldoror (1869, Chant VI):
He is beautiful [...] like the chance meeting of a sewing machine and an um-
brella on the dissecting table.28
Carrouges turns the interpreter’s attention away from the heterogeneous 
setting created by the umbrella as a male symbol and the sewing machine 
as a  female symbol to a  third object in the background of the image, the 
dissecting table. ! e dissecting table does not # gure among the bachelor 
machine’s mechanical and sexual components. However, its importance for 
understanding the bachelor machine is crucial.
27  Michel CARROUGES, “Istruzione per L’uso / Instructions for Use.” In: CLAIR, J. – 
SZEEMANN, H. (eds.). Le macchine celibi / ! e Bachelor Machines. Catalogue La Biennale di
Venezia. Venice: Al# eri Edizioni d’Arte 1975, p. 21 (21–49).
28 Ibid. p. 22.
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[! e dissecting table] represents a speci# c function arising out of the system 
of the two ensembles. Instead of love bed, signifying union and love, the 
dissecting-table expresses the bachelor machine’s speci# c function, which is 
solitude and death.29
! e principal importance of the background, which unites the bachelor 
machine’s components into one system, is con# rmed in Marcel Duchamp’s 
response to the letter sent to him by Carrouges, in which he explained the 
concept of the bachelor machine on the basis of the correspondence between 
! e Large Glass and Franz Ka$ a’s short novels Metamorphosis and In the Pe-
nal Colony. Even though Duchamp expressed doubts about using a method 
based on searching for structural analogies between the upper and the lower 
part of ! e Large Glass and, for example, between the sewing machine and
the umbrella in Les Chantes de Maldoror, he appreciated the analogy be-




I can tell you that the introduction of the ground theme explaining or provok-
ing certain ‘acts’ of the Mariée and the bachelors, never came into my mind 
– but it is likely that my ancestors made me “speak” like them [...].
Celibately yours,
Marcel Duchamp30
! e Turing test
Analogically to the transparent glass plates of ! e Large Glass, the cru-
cial role of the background in the universal Turing machine setting is played
by the imitation game of the Turing test. Turing explains the rules of the 
game as follows:
! e new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we 
call the “imitation game.” It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman 
(B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. ! e interrogator stays in 
29 Ibid.
30 Jean CLAIR – Harald SZEEMANN, Le macchine celibi / ! e Bachelor Machines, catalogue
La Biennale di Venezia. Venice: Al# eri Edizioni d’Arte 1975, p. 49. Available online at: <http://
www.scribd.com/doc/46775310/! e-Bachelor-Machines> [cit. 12. 8. 2013].
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a room apart from the other two. " e object of the game for the interrogator is 
to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman.31
In the second round of the game, one player is replaced by a machine. Turing
asks:
[...] “What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?” Will 
the interrogator decide wrongly as o# en when the game is played like this as he 
does when the game is played between a man and a woman? " ese questions 
replace our original, “Can machines think?”.32
However, it is not the rules for the players’ actions that plays the crucial 
role in the experiment but rather the arrangement of Turing test’s based on 
remote, mediated communication. Turing described this as follows:
[...] the answers should be written, or better still, typewritten. " e ideal ar-
rangement is to have a  teleprinter communicating between the two rooms. 
Alternatively the questions and answers can be repeated by an intermediary. 
[...] " e new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between 
the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man.33
! e magic trick
Katherine N. Hayles has noted the importance of the setting in which Tu-
ring’s imitation game takes place. She writes:
Like all good magic tricks, the test relies on getting you to accept at an early 
stage assumptions that will determine how you interpret what you see later. " e 
important intervention comes not when you try to determine which is a man, 
the woman, or the machine. Rather, the important intervention comes much 
earlier, when the test puts you into a cybernetic system in which represented 
bodies are joined with enacted bodies through mutating and $ exible machine 
interfaces.34
" e Turing test was intended to serve as a means of eliminating the body 
from the de% nition of man. " us it was possible to reduce man to an in-
31  TURING, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” p. 433.
32 Ibid., p. 433.
33 Ibid., p. 433.
34 HAYLES, How We Became Posthuman, p. xiii.
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formation processing system and intelligence to the “ability to manipulate 
formal symbols rather than enaction in the human life-world”.35 While in 
the ! rst round, the game deals with the performativity of gender, in the 
second one, it deals with the performativity of intelligence. " is way, Turing 
was able to make his audience/readers accept the comparison and the hy-
pothetical intersubstitutability of a human’s and a computational machine’s 
intelligences. Hayles wrote that: “[I]n the push to achieve machines that can 
think, researchers performed again and again the erasure of embodiment at 
the heart of the Turing test.”36
It is signi! cant that Hayles highlighted the ritual and performative 
quality of the Turing test in the introductory chapter of her book How We
Became Posthuman.37 She saw in the imitation game “the inaugural moment 
of the computer age”, for it erased the embodied experience from the model 
of human and established a close circuit of references between human and 
machine within a mediated environment. According to Hayles, the Turing 
test proved that:
[T]the overlay between the enacted and the represented bodies is no longer 
a natural inevitably but a contingent production, mediated by technology that 
has become so entwined with the production of identity that it can no longer 
meaningfully be separated from the human subject.38
" e Turing test’s setting of mediated communication, as well as the 
transparent glass plates of ! e Large Glass, or the dissecting table in Les 
Chants de Maldoror are just di$ erent examples of the background which
unites the mechanical and sexual components of bachelor machines to trig-
ger their meaning production. It is as though the imitation game of the Tu-
ring test were taking place on the “dissecting table”, where a man is divided 
into a body and a mind to be transposed onto the level of their symbolic
representations. " e magic trick of the Turing test allows a human or a ma-
chine to be judged by the interrogator on the basis of the communication
established through symbolic exchange and on intellectual arguments only.
However, Turing learned ! rst-hand during his judicial proceeding that 







the laws of the society he lives in. ! e sentence for his “crime” was inscribed 
deep in his body by his hormonal treatment.
Alan, the Bachelor machine
Alan Mathison Turing was born on 23 June 1912 in London in the district of 
Paddington, and he died on 7 June 1954 in Winslow in Cheshire. He was an 
outstanding mathematician, logician, cryptanalyst, and computer scientist. 
His homosexuality resulted in a criminal prosecution against him in 1952, 
when homosexual acts were still illegal in the United Kingdom.39 He was 
arrested, convicted of homosexuality, and put on trial for “acts of gross inde-
cency” between adult men. To avoid imprisonment, Turing agreed to submit 
to a one-year course of oestrogen therapy. In other words, he underwent 
a chemical castration. ! e treatment caused gynecomastia as a side e# ect. 
However, the sentence he was subjected to also had other side e# ects. He was 
excluded from all government research projects owing to a loss of con$ dence 
in him and his unclean criminal record. Two years later, in 1954, he commit-
ted suicide by eating an apple laced with cyanide.40
Coming out of “the toy world”
! e Turing test’s magic power, which lies in its ability to change someone’s 
identity (a man into a woman or a man into a machine) within the setting 
of the imitation game, was re-enacted by Duchamp and Turing themselves 
later when their work on their bachelor machines was done. In this sense, it 
was as though! e Large Glass and the universal Turing machine were just 
blueprints or sketches for further embodiments of the invisible forces whose 
traces maps the bachelor machine diagram.
Subsequently, Marcel Duchamp playfully dealt with performativity of 
a gender identity on his famous transvestite photographs made by Man Ray, 
which show his alter ego Rrose Sélavy. Alan Turing wrote later on “On the 
Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis”41, his prophetic contribution to the math-
39 ! e law was not repealed until 1967.
40  Turing’s biographers, Hodges and Leavitt, suggested that Turin’s death was the re-enactment 
of a scene from his favourite $ lm Snow White (Walt Disney, 1937). Andrew HODGES, Alan 
Turing: ! e Enigma of Intelligence. London: Unwin 1985; David, LEAVITT, ! e Man Who 
Knew Too Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of the Computer. New York – London: W. W.
Norton & Co. 2006.
41  TURING, “On ! e Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis.”
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ematical biology. He wrote the paper at the same year when he underwent 
his judicial proceeding, which ended with condemnation to the hormonal 
treatment of his homosexuality.
Both, Duchamp and Turing, had undergone similar development in 
their interests from mechanic arrangements to organic matters. While Du-
champ had focused on the optical e! ects, which can unsettle our faith into 
empirical experience, thus he remained on the surface of things. Turing’s 
a! air with the organic matter was much more deep-seated, for he not only 
contributed to the mathematical biology, but he underwent the substantial 
body transformation during the hormonal therapy, and he committed sui-
cide just two years later.
Within these regrettable events, he underwent transformation from the
male to female body, and from the life to the death. Turing made coming 
out of the toy world of representation (the metaphor " ts the world of both 
art and mathematics) and entered into the embodied, physical experience of 
becoming someone else.
It can be said that Turing performed the perfect magic trick of the Turing 
test for it was not a trick or an illusion.42 Unlike Duchamp, his transforma-
tion occurred, literally, within his own body. $ us, he should be recognized 
as not only the father of modern computing but also the " rst post-human, 
the “new mutant”,43 in the radical sense of the word.
Epilogue
Turing’s mathematical hypotheses concerning the universal machine and 
the Turing test failed in practice. $ e personal tragedy of Alan Turing proved 
that the universal machine’s axioms, its isolation and completeness, can 
work within the clean laboratory of theory only, but cannot be accomplished 
once the universal machine acquires material form, for example, the form 
of a personal computer, and becomes part of culture. However, we can say 
that Turing won the hypothetical competition between him and the other 
magician, Duchamp, in terms of the magic of transformation. Moreover, 
he became aware of the illusion of his conviction that scienti" c discourse 
evolves within the logic of scienti" c discourse. He feared that the sentence 
he had to face in his private life would a! ect the way his professional work is 
42 See the " lm! e Prestige (2006).
43  Leslie FIEDLER, “$ e New Mutants.” In: Collected Essays of Leslie Fiedler. 2nd vol. New 
York: Stein and Day 1965, pp. 392–400. Available online at: <.http://www.texaschapbookpress.
com/newmutants01.htm > [cit. 12. 8. 2013].
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treated by scienti! c society. He expressed his apprehensions in a syllogism at 
the close of a letter to his friend Norman Routledge.
Turing believes machines think
Turing lies with men
# erefore machines cannot think.
Yours in distress,
Alan44
Turing’s contributions to computer science and his in$ uence on disci-
plines like arti! cial intelligence and advanced robotics are enormous. How-
ever, his personal tragedy was not discussed in public for a long time. Not 
until 10 September 2009, when, following an internet campaign for Turing, 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown made an o%  cial public apology on 
behalf of the British government for “the appalling way he was treated”.
Meanwhile, Turing’s chemically crippled body has worked like an ar-
chetype, in the deep layers of the discourse of computer culture, sublimated 
in Turing’s writings, and interpreted as a logical slip.45 Turing, the man, the
numbers freak, the excellent (human) computer, was for a long time erased 
from the history of computing, and substituted by the universal machine, 
referred to in short, but signi! cantly, as the Turing machine.
To add the universal machine to the list of bachelor machines is a gesture 
of transposition from the realm of mathematics to the realm of culture, from 
the realm of pure logic to the realm of self-expression. By treat the universal 
machine as the bachelor machine the unconscious, the sublimated ”personal 
obsessions”46 that cannot be excluded from the realm of science are made 
44 LEAVITT, ! e Man Who Knew Too Much, p. 5.
45 Hodges interprets Turing’s inclusion of gender in the imitation game of the Turing test as 
a “red herring”. He wrote that the passage of the argument “was not expressed with perfect 
lucidity. # e whole point of this game was that a successful imitation of a woman’s responses 
by a man would not prove anything. Gender depended on facts which were not reducible to 
sequences of symbols.” HODGES, ! e Enigma of Intelligence, p. 415.
46 Curator Harald Szeemann revisited and expanded Carrouges’ argument in 1975, when he 
organized exhibition inspired by Duchamp’s # e Large Glass entitled ! e Bachelor Machines. 
# e exhibition belongs to the series of his exhibitions on personal obsessions. His attempt 
was to visualize the myth, thus he displayed fabricated full-scale models of di& erent bachelor 
machines, including the torture and execution device, which Ka' a described in In the Penal 
Colony at the exhibition. Szeemann interpreted the bachelor machine in a  later interview: 
“It had to do with a belief in eternal energy $ ow as a way to avoid death, as an erotic of life: 
the bachelor as rebel-model, as antiprocreation.” Hans OBRIST, A Brief History of Curating. 
Ostrava: Ringier Print 2008, p. 92–93.
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visible. Paradoxically, from this point of view, the universal machine loses 
its uniqueness as the foundation of individual genius, and it becomes part of 
the many articulations of the bachelor machine myth. ! is way the univer-
sal machine becomes part of general cultural production and its signi" cance 
penetrate far and deep into our culture.
Jana Horákova
